Simpson's Paradox





Simpson's Paradox

Simpson's Paradox

The Setup: Choosing a Surgeon

  • Imagine you need surgery and compare two doctors' track records:
    • Dr. Jones: 86% overall success rate
    • Dr. Smith: 79% overall success rate
  • The numbers seem to make the choice for you

Question: Is picking the doctor with the higher success rate always the rational choice?

Simpson's Paradox

Watch: Simpson's Paradox Explained

Simpson's Paradox

Digging Deeper: Split by Patient Risk

  • Ask the hospital for outcomes broken down by patient type
  • High-risk patients:
    • Dr. Smith: 75% success
    • Dr. Jones: 70% success
  • Low-risk patients:
    • Dr. Smith: 95% success
    • Dr. Jones: 90% success
  • Dr. Smith wins both subgroups — yet loses overall
Simpson's Paradox

The Numbers, Visualized

center

Simpson's Paradox

How Is This Possible? The Caseload Mix

center

Simpson's Paradox

Doing the Math: Weighted Averages

Dr. Smith (20 low-risk, 80 high-risk)

  • Low-risk: 20 × 95% = 19 survivors
  • High-risk: 80 × 75% = 60 survivors
  • Total: 79 / 100 = 79%

Dr. Jones (80 low-risk, 20 high-risk)

  • Low-risk: 80 × 90% = 72 survivors
  • High-risk: 20 × 70% = 14 survivors
  • Total: 86 / 100 = 86%
Simpson's Paradox

Naming the Phenomenon

  • Simpson's Paradox:
    • a trend appears in several groups of data
      • but disappears or reverses when the groups are combined
  • Variables can be positively correlated within every subgroup
    • yet negatively correlated in aggregate
  • The overall number told you to pick Jones
  • The subgroup breakdown says Smith is the better choice,
    • for either kind of patient
Simpson's Paradox

Trend Reversal, Visualized

center

  • Left: no group labels — looks like one clean downward trend
  • Right: same data, colored by group — each group actually trends upward
  • No single point moved — only whether the grouping was visible
Simpson's Paradox

The Lurking Variable

  • A lurking (confounding) variable is a hidden factor
    • that changes what the data appears to say
  • In this example:
    • it is the proportion of high-risk vs. low-risk patients each surgeon treats
    • It's correlated with:
      • The outcome (high-risk patients survive less often, regardless of surgeon)
      • The group being compared (Smith sees far more high-risk cases)
    • Ignore it, and the aggregate comparison is comparing apples to oranges
Simpson's Paradox

Real-World Case: Hospital Rankings

  • Major referral centers and trauma hospitals
    • often look worse on raw survival-rate rankings
  • Reason:
    • they take the sickest, most complex patients that smaller hospitals decline to treat
  • Once outcomes are risk-adjusted for patient severity,
    • top referral centers often move up substantially
  • Raw league tables can punish the hospitals doing the hardest, most valuable work

Source: Krumholz et al. (2006), risk-standardized mortality methodology — see References

Simpson's Paradox

Real-World Case: Kidney Stone Treatments (1986)

Success rate Small stones Large stones Overall
Open surgery (older) 93% (81/87) 73% (192/263) 78% (273/350)
PCNL (newer, less invasive) 87% (234/270) 69% (55/80) 83% (289/350)
  • The newer treatment looks better overall — but is worse for both stone sizes
  • Cause: doctors gave the newer treatment mostly small, easier stones
  • This was an observational comparison, not a randomized trial

Source: Charig et al. (1986), British Medical Journal — see References

Simpson's Paradox

Real-World Case: UC Berkeley Admissions (1973)

  • Berkeley's graduate admissions showed an aggregate gap:
    • 44% of male applicants admitted vs. 35% of female applicants
  • This looked like evidence of bias against women applicants
  • Broken down by department,
    • most departments showed no bias — some even favored women slightly
  • Explanation:
    • women applied in greater numbers to more competitive departments
      • with lower overall admit rates

Source: Bickel, Hammel & O'Connell (1975), Science — see References

Simpson's Paradox

Real-World Cases: Age as the Lurking Variable

Smoking and survival (UK)

  • 20-year follow-up of 1,314 women in Whickham
  • Overall: 24% of smokers died vs 31% of non-smokers
  • The non-smokers were older on average
  • Within most age groups, smokers died at the higher rate

COVID-19 case fatality (2020)

  • Italy's overall case fatality rate was higher than China's
  • Yet Italy's rate was lower in every age group
  • Italy's confirmed cases were much older
  • Same mechanism: a different mix, not a different risk

Sources: Appleton, French & Vanderpump (1996); von Kügelgen, Gresele & Schölkopf (2021) — see References

Simpson's Paradox

Aggregates Can Deceive

  • An overall rate is a weighted average of subgroup rates, weighted by group size
  • A group with a large, easy subset can post a high overall number without being the best performer
  • A group with a large, hard subset can post a low overall number despite being the best performer
  • This isn't rare — it shows up in medicine, admissions, sports, sales, and A/B tests
  • Golden Rule: an aggregate statistic is a starting question, not a final answer
Simpson's Paradox

Look for Subgroups — Carefully

  • Before trusting an aggregate comparison, ask:
    • What natural subgroups exist in this data?
    • Are they distributed unevenly across the things being compared?
    • Does splitting by subgroup change — or reverse — the conclusion?
  • But splitting has its own risks:
    • Slice the data enough ways and some split will reverse almost any result
    • Small subgroups give noisy rates
  • Choose splits for a reason before looking at the results
Simpson's Paradox

Split or Combine? Ask What Causes What

  • Split when the third variable affects both the group and the outcome
    • Patient risk → which surgeon and survival
    • Stone size → which treatment and success
  • Combine when the third variable is caused by the thing being compared
    • A drug lowers blood pressure, and lower blood pressure aids recovery
    • Splitting by blood pressure hides part of the drug's real effect
  • The same numbers can call for either answer
    • the data alone can't tell you which — how the data was produced does

Source: Pearl (2014), Understanding Simpson's Paradox — see References

Simpson's Paradox

Before You Present a Comparison

  1. List plausible lurking variables — and how each relates to the groups and the outcome
  2. Compute both aggregate and subgroup rates; check whether the subgroup weights differ
  3. Investigate any reversal — don't dismiss it as a data error
  4. Decide split vs combine from what causes what, not from which answer you prefer
  5. Report risk-adjusted or stratified metrics alongside raw ones
  6. Never rank people, teams, or hospitals on raw aggregate rates alone
Simpson's Paradox

Key Takeaway

  • The aggregate number is never the whole story
  • Always ask what's hiding underneath the average:
    • a lurking variable,
    • an uneven mix,
    • a hidden group

Sometimes the better choice looks worse on paper

Simpson's Paradox

References

Topic Source
Simpson (1951) Simpson, E. H. (1951). The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B, 13(2), 238–241.
Bickel, Hammel & O'Connell (1975) Bickel, P. J., Hammel, E. A., & O'Connell, J. W. (1975). Sex Bias in Graduate Admissions: Data from Berkeley. Science, 187(4175), 398–404.
Charig et al. (1986) Charig, C. R., Webb, D. R., Payne, S. R., & Wickham, J. E. A. (1986). Comparison of Treatment of Renal Calculi by Open Surgery, Percutaneous Nephrolithotomy, and Extracorporeal Shockwave Lithotripsy. British Medical Journal, 292(6524), 879–882.
Krumholz et al. (2006) Krumholz, H. M., Wang, Y., Mattera, J. A., et al. (2006). An Administrative Claims Model Suitable for Profiling Hospital Performance Based on 30-Day Mortality Rates Among Patients With Heart Failure. Circulation, 113(13), 1693–1701.
Appleton, French & Vanderpump (1996) Appleton, D. R., French, J. M., & Vanderpump, M. P. J. (1996). Ignoring a Covariate: An Example of Simpson's Paradox. The American Statistician, 50(4), 340–341.
Pearl (2014) Pearl, J. (2014). Understanding Simpson's Paradox. The American Statistician, 68(1), 8–13.
von Kügelgen, Gresele & Schölkopf (2021) von Kügelgen, J., Gresele, L., & Schölkopf, B. (2021). Simpson's Paradox in COVID-19 Case Fatality Rates: A Mediation Analysis of Age-Related Causal Effects. IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence, 2(1), 18–27.

⏱️ Slide Timing: 1 min - Welcome and frame the session: a data paradox that can quietly flip life-or-death decisions - Promise: by the end, everyone will know to ask "what's hiding inside this average?" - Bridge: open with a scenario that feels like an easy, obvious choice

⏱️ Slide Timing: 2 min - Anchor the audience in a relatable, high-stakes decision — nobody picks a surgeon casually - 86% vs 79% looks like a 7-point gap, which feels decisive - Hold the blockquote question — the next slides will overturn the obvious answer ❓ Ask: "Based on these two numbers alone, who would you pick?"

⏱️ Slide Timing: 1 min - Good slide to leave on screen for anyone who wants to rewatch the walkthrough after the session - The TED-Ed video is the shorter pre-read; its hospital example mirrors the surgeon story here - Its closing point sets up the "Split or Combine?" slide near the end of this deck

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - The reveal: Smith is better with the hard cases AND the easy cases - This is the moment that should feel logically impossible — flag it explicitly - Let the contradiction sit for a beat before explaining it on the next slide

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - Same data as the last slide, now side by side — the pink bars (Smith) beat the blue bars (Jones) in both subgroups - Then the rightmost pair flips: Jones's overall bar is taller than Smith's - This single chart is the entire paradox in one image — everything after explains why it happens

⏱️ Slide Timing: 4 min - Dr. Smith is a specialist — 80 of her last 100 patients were high-risk cases - Dr. Jones handles mostly routine surgery — 80 of his last 100 patients were low-risk - The two doctors aren't being compared on the same mix of cases at all

⏱️ Slide Timing: 4 min - Walk through the arithmetic slowly — this is the "aha" slide where the paradox stops feeling magical - Jones's overall number is pulled up by a large, easy caseload, not superior skill - Smith's overall number is pulled down by a large, difficult caseload, not inferior skill

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - Formal definition, now that the audience has already felt the paradox firsthand - Emphasize: this isn't a rare edge case — it's a structural risk in any aggregated comparison - The named phenomenon dates to statistician Edward Simpson's 1951 paper, though the effect was noted earlier by others including Karl Pearson

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - This is the general shape of Simpson's Paradox beyond the surgeon example — it applies to any X-Y relationship, not just success rates - Left panel is what a naive analysis sees; right panel is what stratifying by group reveals — same data, opposite conclusion - The mechanism is the same as the surgeon case: groups differ in their typical X position, and that positioning — not the true within-group relationship — dominates the aggregate

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - This slide is the conceptual core — everything else in the deck is an application of this one idea - A lurking variable doesn't have to be exotic — patient mix, timing, sample size, or geography are common culprits - Rule of thumb: whenever you compare rates across groups, ask what else differs between those groups

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - Direct real-world echo of the surgeon example, now at institutional scale - This is why healthcare quality metrics increasingly report "risk-adjusted mortality," not raw mortality - Ties back to policy: a naive public ranking could steer patients away from the centers best equipped to save them

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - Same structure as the surgeon example, with real data: the lurking variable is stone size - Large stones are harder to treat AND were steered toward open surgery — so open surgery's overall rate is dragged down by its harder caseload - Randomization is the standard defense: if a coin decides who gets which treatment, stone size can't line up with treatment choice - Observational data — patient records, product analytics, most dashboards — has no such protection ❓ Ask: "Where in your own data does someone choose which group a case lands in?"

⏱️ Slide Timing: 4 min - One of the most famous real applications of Simpson's Paradox, published by Bickel, Hammel & O'Connell in Science (1975) - The lurking variable here is choice of department, not applicant sex — competitive departments admit fewer applicants of any gender - Important nuance to state clearly: this doesn't prove there was zero bias anywhere in the system, just that the aggregate number alone was misleading as evidence ❓ Ask: "If you only saw the aggregate 44% vs 35% figures, what would you have concluded?"

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - Age is the most common lurking variable in practice: it drives outcomes and it differs between almost any two populations you might compare - Smoking: the smokers in the sample were younger, so fewer of them died in 20 years — the aggregate made smoking look protective - COVID: early cross-country comparisons of fatality rates were largely comparisons of age structure and testing - The smoking case also appears in the TED-Ed video on the Watch slide

⏱️ Slide Timing: 2 min - Transition slide — moving from "here's the paradox" to "here's what to do about it" - Reconnect explicitly to the surgeon math slide: the weights differed, so the comparison was not apples-to-apples - A/B tests: if traffic splits shift between segments mid-test (e.g. mobile vs desktop), the blended conversion rate can reverse the per-segment result

⏱️ Slide Timing: 3 min - Encourage a habit: whenever a metric compares two groups (doctors, campaigns, cohorts), ask what's unevenly distributed underneath it - The counterweight: hunting through dozens of segments until one flips is its own way to mislead - A split justified by how the data was produced (patient risk, stone size, age) is far more credible than one found by searching

⏱️ Slide Timing: 4 min - This slide stops the audience over-learning "always stratify" — the subgroup view is not automatically the true one - Confounder (split): a common cause of both the grouping and the outcome - Mediator (combine): a step on the path from the thing being compared to the outcome — conditioning on it removes part of the effect you want to measure - This is the same conclusion the TED-Ed video ends on: sometimes the overall number gives the more accurate picture ❓ Ask: "In the surgeon example, could the surgeon have caused the patient's risk level? Why does that matter?"

⏱️ Slide Timing: 2 min - Workflow version of everything covered — a checklist to run before presenting or signing off on any comparative metric - Every item here is a check the surgeon example, by construction, would fail

⏱️ Slide Timing: 1 min - Closing summary before references — the three lines here compress the entire deck - If nothing else survives from this session, this slide should

⏱️ Slide Timing: 1 min - Simpson (1951) is the formal statistical origin, though the pattern was observed earlier by Pearson and Yule - Charig et al. (1986) is the classic kidney-stone treatment case, textbook example of Simpson's Paradox in a clinical trial - Krumholz et al. (2006) underlies the risk-standardized mortality methodology CMS uses for hospital rankings - Bickel, Hammel & O'Connell (1975) is the canonical UC Berkeley case study referenced earlier in the deck - Pearl (2014) gives a modern causal-inference framing of why and when the paradox occurs — the basis of the "Split or Combine?" slide - Appleton et al. (1996) is the Whickham smoking study; von Kügelgen et al. (2021) analyses the Italy vs China COVID-19 reversal